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Abstract
In this paper, we present a new model of UK public finances which aims to shed light on recent
problems of forecasting the PSBR. The main elements of public spending are treated as
endogenous variables which rise in line with GDP over the medium term. Also, the cyclical
response of public borrowing to rises in the level of economic activity is more muted when growth
is export-led than when it is consumer-led. These two features go a long way towards explaining
the rapid deterioration of public finances in the early 1990s and the slow pace of improvement
since 1993.
JEL classification: C53, E62, H62.
I. INTRODUCTION
A medium-term approach to fiscal policy has been a major theme of UK
government policy since 1979. The Conservative government that came to power
in that year launched a Medium-Term Financial Strategy (MTFS), the objective of
which was to reduce both inflation and the public sector deficit. In the original
formulation of the MTFS, these objectives were directly linked, with the reduction
in the contribution to monetary growth from public borrowing identified as a key
mechanism through which inflation would be curtailed. As the 1980s progressed,
the government’s faith in this mechanistic link between the public sector
borrowing requirement (PSBR), the money supply and inflation faded. However,
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the emphasis on setting prudent medium-term objectives for government
borrowing continued because of the belief that a sound fiscal position underpinned
the financial stability of the economy more generally. This approach has carried
through from the Conservatives to the new Labour administration.
This medium-term approach to fiscal policy is inevitably reliant on forecasts of
public borrowing. There are two reasons for this. First, forecasts or projections
are necessary to show the impact of current fiscal plans for the path of public
borrowing in future years. Projections of the PSBR — or another measure of the
government deficit — are needed to show that tax reductions (or public spending
increases) are consistent with a prudent level of public borrowing or to justify tax
rises (or spending restraint).
Second, the level of public borrowing is very sensitive to the state of the cycle.
Government expenditure is pushed up by recessions, whereas tax receipts fall,
causing the deficit to rise in periods when economic activity is weak and fall when
the economy is growing strongly. For example, recent estimates by the Treasury
suggest that the PSBR/GDP ratio will fall/rise by around 0.8 percentage point for
every 1 percentage point by which output growth is above/below trend (Virley and
Hirst, 1995). The current level of public borrowing will therefore flatter the
underlying position close to the peak of the cycle while presenting too pessimistic
a picture when the economy is in recession. A projection of public borrowing in
future years therefore provides a picture of how the fiscal position will look as the
state of the economy returns to a more neutral cyclical position.
Large errors in forecasting public finances in the late 1980s and 1990s have
put the spotlight on the techniques that the Treasury and independent forecasters
have used to generate their projections of public borrowing. A recent analysis by
Treasury economists (HM Treasury, 1997a) showed that the average absolute
error for official projections of public borrowing was nearly 2 per cent of GDP for
a two-years-ahead forecast and nearly 4 per cent for four years ahead.
1 These
errors contributed to the loss of control over public borrowing which saw the
PSBR explode from broad balance in 1990–91 to over £45 billion (7.1 per cent of
GDP) in 1993–94. Forecasters were also surprised by the slow pace of
improvement of public finances in the early years of the recovery of the 1990s,
despite significant tax rises in 1994 and 1995.
Some of these errors reflected the fact that the recession of the early 1990s was
much longer and deeper than forecasters expected. However, this is only part of
the story, accounting for only half of official PSBR forecast errors in the late
1980s and the 1990s.
2 In this paper, we present a new model of UK public
finances which aims to capture more satisfactorily how public finances respond to
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changes in the level of economic activity. This model has been developed as part
of the re-estimation and respecification of the London Business School (LBS)
macroeconomic model of the UK economy.
3 A key feature of this model is that it
treats the main elements of public spending (current spending on goods and
services and transfers to the personal sector) as endogenous variables which rise in
line with — though not faster than — GDP over the medium term. The model also
produces a very different cyclical response of public borrowing to rises in the level
of economic activity when growth is export-led from when it is consumer-led.
These two features go a long way towards explaining the rapid deterioration of
public finances in the early 1990s and the slow pace of improvement since 1993.
Section II sets out the structure of the model and the main equations that
underpin it. Section III discusses how adequately it explains the forecasting errors
of the late 1980s and 1990s. Section IV looks at what the model suggests about
the current outlook for public finances and contrasts this with the latest official
projections.
II. MODELLING PUBLIC FINANCES
There are three ways in which the process of economic growth affects public
finances and influences the level of government borrowing. First, a higher level of
economic activity increases the tax base and therefore generates a stronger stream
of revenues. Second, spending on social security benefits fluctuates with the level
of unemployment. Government spending on unemployment and related benefits
rises in recessions and drops back when the economy is booming. Third, the
demand for public services will tend to rise as the economy grows over the
medium term and real incomes increase. The first two of these mechanisms are
crucial to understanding the performance of public finances over the cycle. But if
we are to build a model of public finances that is to be used for medium-term
projections, it is also important that we understand the third of these linkages: the
relationship between the level of real income and public spending over the medium
term.
One view of this relationship is that there is a persistent tendency of public
spending to grow more rapidly than real incomes — which would imply a rising
share of public spending in national income. As early as 1890, the German
economist Wagner noted the tendency of public spending to rise faster than
national output (Wagner, 1890) — subsequently described as ‘Wagner’s Law’ —
implying that the public spending share of GDP would rise over time. Wagner’s
analysis was based on the idea that, as society became more industrialised, the
demands on the supporting infrastructure provided by the State would rise
significantly, absorbing an increasingly large share of national income. A related
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idea is the notion that a number of key services provided by the public sector — in
particular, health and education — are highly income-elastic. This tendency for
public spending to rise faster than national income could also be reinforced by a
‘relative price effect’ due to slower productivity growth in service activities, where
government spending is concentrated (see Baumol (1967)).
However, public spending cannot rise more rapidly than national income
indefinitely. As public spending absorbs an increasing share of GDP, the tax
burden needs to rise and/or public borrowing will increase. This, in turn, creates
some resistance to further increases in the public spending share of national
income. This resistance to higher taxes and increased public borrowing has been
particularly noticeable in the UK since the mid-1970s, following the financial
crisis of 1976 when the Labour government felt obliged to call on the support of
the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Since the late 1970s, the upward trend in
the public spending share of GDP has been arrested — as Figure 1 shows — and
the dominant influence on the proportion of national output accounted for by
government expenditure has been the state of the cycle. The boom of the late
1980s saw a sharp fall in the public spending share of GDP, followed by a sharp
rise in the early 1990s as the economy moved into recession.
FIGURE 1
General Government Expenditure as a Percentage of GDP
Title:  Hall/O'Sullivan fig 1
Creator:  FreeHand 7.0
CreationDate:  27/1/98 1:35 pm
Source: UK National Accounts, 1996 edition, Office for National Statistics.
1. Modelling Public Expenditure
In our modelling of public finances, we treat the mid-1970s as a watershed and
our concern is to understand how public spending and taxation have been affectedModelling and Forecasting UK Public Finances
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by economic growth over the last 20 years or so. Over this period, financing
constraints have put a brake on the tendency of public spending to rise as a share
of GDP. However, if we consider the two main items of current expenditure —
government consumption of goods and services and grants to the personal sector
(mainly social security payments) — there has been no tendency for public
spending to fall as a share of GDP, as Figure 2 shows. Rather, the brunt of public
spending restraint has fallen on capital expenditure, which has halved as a share of
GDP since the early 1970s, dropping from around 5 per cent of GDP to 2½ per
cent. Both main components of government current expenditure have fluctuated
with the cycle. However, allowing for these fluctuations, expenditure on goods and
services has been broadly stable as a share of GDP whereas social security
continued to rise until the mid-1980s as unemployment continued to increase.
Our model of government expenditure, which is based on an econometric
analysis of the main components of public spending over the last 20 years, has
four key features which jointly explain this pattern:
1. Government current spending on goods and services is a constant share of
GDP, fluctuating around this constant level with the state of the cycle, which is
measured by the gap between the actual level of output and its trend value,
based on a growth rate of just over 2 per cent.
2. Current grants and subsidies follow a similar pattern of behaviour but are also
influenced directly by the level of unemployment and deviations between the
FIGURE 2
Components of Government Spending as a Percentage of GDP
Title:  Hall/O'Sullivan fig 2
Creator:  FreeHand 7.0
CreationDate:  27/1/98 1:36 pm
Source: UK National Accounts, 1996 edition, Office for National Statistics.Fiscal Studies
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headline measure of retail prices and an underlying measure of the price level
(reflecting the fact that benefits are uprated in line with the headline retail price
index (RPI)).
3. Social security spending is also pushed up from 1992 by special factors
unrelated to unemployment. We interpret this as reflecting a relaxation in
government spending which occurred around the time of the 1992 election and
increased claims for disability and housing benefit.
4. At times of public spending restraint, it is capital spending that ‘takes the
strain’ — both directly and through a reduction in the government contribution
to the financing of investment by nationalised industries (Sentance, 1994). As
the CBI has noted, ‘When pressure is put on spending totals, capital spending
can appear easiest to cut: few sewers will collapse if replacement is put off;
buildings will not fall down; and roads will remain, albeit with growing
potholes’ (Confederation of British Industry, 1988). Asset sales, such as
council house transfers and privatisation, can also help to reduce government
spending. More recently, squeezing capital expenditure has involved shifting
the financing of investment from the public to the private sector, through the
Private Finance Initiative.
Technical details of this model are set out in the Appendix and in Hall,
O’Sullivan and Sentance (1996). The model has satisfactory long-run properties,
in that the share of current public expenditure in GDP will fluctuate with the cycle
around a constant proportion which moves up and down with the equilibrium level
of unemployment.
4 The model also passes the necessary econometric tests, in that
it is based on a cointegrating relationship, which is a key requirement of a
satisfactory time-series model (Engle and Granger, 1987; Hall, Cuthbertson and
Taylor, 1992).
2. Modelling Tax Receipts
Turning to the revenue side of the account, our approach has the same objectives
— the estimation of a simple model that fits the data well and that has sensible
long-run properties. In the absence of tax avoidance, variations in the timing of tax
payments due and complicated rules relating to tax allowances, modelling tax
receipts would require only a simple accounting identity. Tax receipts would be
equal to the tax rate multiplied by the tax base. The tax equations that underpin
our model are based on this approach. However, our estimated equations also need
to make some allowance for the multiplicity of tax rates and the complexity of the
system of allowances.
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For each of the major taxes, we estimate an equation based on the following
relationship:
) ( A X t T - =q
where T = tax receipts, t is a measure of the tax rate, X is a measure of the tax
base gross of allowances, A is a measure of the current value of allowances and q
is a parameter reflecting economic influences on the structure of the tax system. If
we estimate this equation in log form, we would expect there to be a unit
coefficient on both the tax rate and the tax base net of allowances — allowing for
timing effects.
Table 1 summarises the five main equations that form the basis of our model of
public finances.
5 The equation determining VAT receipts is particularly interesting
as it implies that the relationship between VAT payments and consumption varies
with the strength of consumer spending relative to income (one minus the personal
savings ratio, which measures the proportion of personal disposable income not
consumed). Figure 3 illustrates this relationship, showing how the VAT receipts
rose relative to nominal consumption in the late 1980s, as the savings ratio fell,
and then dropped back again in the early 1990s, as consumption weakened.
TABLE 1
Modelling the Tax System















VAT Consumption — Savings ratio
National Insurance Wages and salaries — Self-employment
income as ratio of
wage bill
Excise duties Consumption — —
aDividend payments are deducted from the tax base as we are modelling mainstream corporation tax receipts.
Advance corporation tax (ACT) is included with personal income tax.
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FIGURE 3
VAT Receipts and the Savings Ratio
Title:  Hall/O'Sullivan fig 3
Creator:  FreeHand 7.0
CreationDate:  30/1/98 9:51 am
Source: Hall, O’Sullivan and Sentance, 1996.
One possible explanation of this pattern of behaviour is that the cyclical
elements of consumer spending bear a disproportionate share of VAT, as food and
other ‘essentials’ are zero-rated. More detailed work by the Treasury has
challenged this view, arguing that ‘little if any of the fall in the (underlying) VAT /
consumer spending ratio looks to be attributable to shifts in the mix of spending’
(HM Treasury, 1997b). Instead, Treasury economists attribute the weakness of
VAT receipts in the 1990s to structural changes in the VAT system, including tax
regime changes, successful legal challenges and the increased use of tax planning
and tax avoidance. However, these findings can still be reconciled with our results
if the effort that companies devote to legal challenges, tax planning and tax
avoidance varies with the buoyancy of consumer spending — as the sharp increase
in the erosion of the tax base in the early 1990s
6 and the bounce-back in VAT
receipts in the wake of the recent recovery in consumer spending suggest.
Though our system of tax equations is very stylised, Table 2 shows that the
implied revenue effects of tax changes are very similar to those set out in the IFS
Green Budget (Institute for Fiscal Studies, 1995). The main exception is in the
case of corporation tax (CT), where our equation focuses on explaining
mainstream CT payments and therefore gives lower figures for the effects of tax
rate changes. It is also worth noting that this is the least satisfactory of the
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equations we have estimated, though we are not alone in finding it difficult to
account satisfactorily for changes in CT revenues.
To complete our model of public finances, a number of other equations need to
be added. On the expenditure side, one important missing link is a model of debt
interest, which embodies the accumulation of debt and links interest payments to
other interest rates in the model. A number of other miscellaneous items of public
expenditure also need to be included, such as capital grants and net lending by
government (which is affected by privatisation proceeds). On the receipts side, we
have not modelled capital taxes and other miscellaneous items such as profits,
rents, royalties and interest receipts. Some stylised equations are used to determine
these elements in our forecasting model, but these do not change the essential
features of our analysis of the medium-term evolution of public finances.
III. ANALYSING PUBLIC FINANCES
A key feature of the model we have set out in this paper is that there is no
automatic tendency for public borrowing to fall as the economy grows over the
medium term. It is therefore misleading for policymakers to talk in terms of a
‘growth dividend’ which pays for tax cuts. There may be some modest ‘fiscal
drag’ in the tax system which arises from the fact that tax allowances are indexed
to prices rather than to wages. There may also be other shifts in the structure of
income and spending in the economy that result in tax receipts rising more rapidly
than GDP for a while. But over the medium term, our tax equations imply that
receipts will rise in line with the tax base, unless there are changes in tax rates or
the structure of allowances. Given that most of these tax bases (wages,
consumption, profits, etc.) will tend to follow the growth of money GDP over the
medium term, this implies a broadly constant tax burden (receipts as a percentage
TABLE 2
Tax Ready Reckoners, using Estimated Tax Equations:
impact on revenues of 1 percentage point change
£ million
London Business School Green Budget (IFS, 1995)
1996–97 1997–98 1996–97 1997–98
Standard income tax rate 1,260 1,600 1,600 2,000
Corporation tax rate 200 420 630 940
VAT rate 1,950 2,680 2,540 2,675
Employers’ NI 2,270 2,430 2,380 2,750
Employees’ NI 2,270 2,430 1,875 2,155Fiscal Studies
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of national income), in the absence of policy changes, as the economy grows over
time.
The same tendencies apply on the expenditure side of the financial account. If
there is no change in the equilibrium level of unemployment, current public
spending will rise in line with the trend growth of GDP. Government expenditure
as a share of national output will tend to fall in boom periods, but this apparent
progress comes undone in recessions.
7 The experience of the late 1980s shows the
problems that ensue if a cyclical improvement in public finances is used to finance
a programme of tax cuts. The tax-cutting Budgets of 1986–89 went far beyond
anything that was justified by the underlying control of public spending. Only by
covertly clawing back the benefits of the tax give-aways of the late 1980s — in the
form of reduced tax allowances, higher indirect taxes and higher National
Insurance contributions — has it been possible to restore some order to public
finances during 1994 and 1995. The new Labour government has built on this
with (covert) tax increases of its own — changing the tax treatment of pension
funds and bringing in a windfall tax on privatised utilities.
This tendency of current spending to rise in line with GDP over the long run is
not set in stone. Before the mid-1970s, government expenditure rose more rapidly
than national income. A resumption of that upward trend seems unlikely. Rather,
recent discussion has focused on the ability of governments to set the public
spending share of GDP on a declining trend. In the 1980s, the Conservative
government did indeed claim that it had achieved such a reversal. However, these
claims rested solely on cuts in capital spending, the short-term benefits of sales of
physical and financial assets and cyclical swings in the ratio of current spending to
national income.
It is certainly possible to envisage policy changes redefining the scope of the
public sector that would change the historic relationship between public spending
and GDP. However, the most significant steps that have been taken in this area —
relating to pensions provision — will only have an effect over a very long time
horizon. Radical changes in the scope of the Welfare State seem unlikely to change
the outlook for public finances over a five- to 10-year time horizon. In the absence
of such changes, governments will be reliant on further cuts in capital spending to
achieve a sustained reduction in the public spending share of GDP or an
improvement in labour market performance that allows the economy to sustain a
lower equilibrium unemployment rate.
Another feature of our model is the sensitivity of public finances to the state of
the cycle. But there is a twist to this story. It is not just the fact that there was a
boom in the late 1980s that caused such a dramatic improvement in public
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finances. It was the fact that this boom was led by consumer spending, which
contributed to such a rapid reduction in the PSBR. Table 3 shows the effect of a
cyclical rise in GDP on public finances arising from two sources: a rise in
consumption, due to a fall in the savings ratio, and a rise in exports, generated by
higher world GDP. In each case, the simulation has been conducted so as to
generate an immediate and sustained 1 per cent increase in GDP. The simulations
are conducted with monetary policy set to keep inflation broadly steady, using an
inflation control rule developed for the LBS model (see Nixon and Hall (1996)).
8
In both cases, there is a fall in the share of government spending in GDP,
reflecting the cyclical nature of the public spending / GDP ratio. (We are
assuming the trend growth of GDP and hence public spending has not changed.)
But the effects through the tax system are very different in the two scenarios.
Higher consumer spending causes VAT and excise duties to rise, whereas there
is no equivalent indirect tax boost from higher exports. Export-led growth does
raise consumption as multiplier effects feed through, but much less significantly
than in the other scenario. Indeed, as monetary policy is tightened to combat the
inflationary impact of higher output, a strengthening exchange rate squeezes
exports and boosts import volumes. As a result, a rise of over 2 per cent in
consumption is required to produce a 1 percentage point rise in real GDP. In
addition, our system of equations indicates that a fall in the savings ratio (which
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TABLE 3
Public Finances: Impact of a 1 Percentage Point ‘Cyclical’ Rise in GDP





Year 1 –0.36 +0.10 –0.46
Year 2 –0.34 +0.43 –0.77
Year 3 –0.48 +0.41 –0.89
LBS: Export-led
Year 1 –0.36 –0.09 –0.27
Year 2 –0.41 –0.09 –0.32
Year 3 –0.48 — –0.48
Treasury
Year 1 –0.40 +0.10 –0.50
Year 2 –0.55 +0.25 –0.80Fiscal Studies
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generates the increase in consumer spending in our scenario) causes VAT receipts
to rise more rapidly than consumer spending.
Export-led growth causes a larger rise in corporation tax receipts than
consumption-led growth. But the impact of this improvement in corporate tax
revenues is modest by comparison with the increased VAT and other consumption
taxes generated by strong consumer spending. As a consequence, the PSBR ratio
falls by 0.4 per cent of GDP more in response to a 1 per cent rise in output driven
by consumption than in response to export-driven growth.
As a reference point, Table 3 also shows recent Treasury estimates of the
cyclical nature of public borrowing (Virley and Hirst, 1995). These estimates are
in line with the figures produced by our simulations for the impact on the PSBR of
a consumer-led cyclical rise in output. This is not surprising as the Treasury
estimates were based on the experience of the 1980s — a strongly consumer-led
cycle. However, if the recovery is more strongly export-led, which was the case in
the early years of the current expansion, our simulations indicate that the
improvement in public finances will be less dramatic, which helps to explain the
sluggishness of tax revenues in 1994 and 1995.
These findings suggest that simple estimates of the cyclical nature of public
finances need to be treated with caution on two counts. First, if the cyclical
impulse is overseas demand, the improvement in public finances is much less
significant than if there is consumer-led growth. Second, a key component of the
fall in the PSBR/GDP ratio stems from the failure of government spending to rise
with GDP, causing a fall in the spending/GDP ratio, as Table 3 shows. If
government spending rises with GDP, this element of the PSBR improvement will
be wiped out. These two factors — together with other temporary influences, such
as the impact of high privatisation proceeds and council house sales in 1988–89
— explain why the dramatic improvement in public finances in the late 1980s was
not sustained. The fact that the cyclical recovery in the early 1990s was more
strongly export-led also helps to explain why public finances did not improve as
dramatically in the early years of the recovery as the government and other
forecasters expected. Now that consumption is picking up more strongly, it is not
surprising to see public borrowing falling more sharply than forecast.
IV. THE OUTLOOK FOR PUBLIC FINANCES
The latest projections in the government’s Pre-Budget Report show the PSBR
falling sharply from £22.6 billion (3 per cent of GDP) in 1996–97 to £9.5 billion
in the current financial year (1997–98) and just £4.5 billion in 1998–99. However,
our own assessment is that this view of the short-term outlook for public finances
is too pessimistic. The November 1997 London Business School forecast (London
Business School, 1997) suggested that the PSBR would fall more sharply in
1998–99, dropping to just £1.3 billion, despite the fact that our forecast ofModelling and Forecasting UK Public Finances
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economic growth next year is more subdued than the official projection.
9 This
reflects the fact that our model suggests a strong boost to revenues from the
consumer-led upturn that is currently under way, for the reasons outlined in the
previous section.
However, looking to the medium term, official projections of public borrowing
still look too optimistic. The July 1997 Budget set out medium-term projections
for the period 1999–2000 to 2001–02 on three different assumptions for real
public spending growth over the second half of the Parliament: 0.75 per cent per
annum, 1.5 per cent per annum and 2.25 per cent per annum. In the light of our
modelling of public expenditure trends, only the last of these three figures appears
remotely realistic. Public spending is currently being squeezed tightly to bring
down public borrowing, with total government expenditure (excluding
privatisation proceeds) set to rise by just 2.6 per cent a year in cash terms between
1996–97 and 1998–99 — roughly in line with the rate of inflation. Even though
some of this squeeze is being achieved by moving capital spending off the balance
sheet through the Private Finance Initiative (PFI), this period of restraint involves
holding the growth of public spending well below its long-run real growth rate of
just over 2 per cent. It will be hard to resist pressures for some ‘catch-up’ after
this period of restraint and keeping the growth of public spending to just over 2
per cent in the second half of the Parliament is likely to prove demanding. And yet
this is the highest figure that the Treasury has included in its range of projections.
Figure 4 compares this ‘pessimistic’ official scenario with two projections
produced using the LBS model of public finances: our central forecast and a more
extreme scenario when the economy goes through a more pronounced cycle, with
stronger growth in 1998 but weaker performance in 1999 and 2000.
10 Both LBS
scenarios are more pessimistic than the Treasury over the medium term. In the
boom–bust scenario, public finances move into surplus next year but the
improvement is reversed in future years as the economy weakens. By contrast, the
Treasury projections suggest that public finances are headed for surplus under
current policies, even if public spending is at the top end of its estimates. (If public
spending grows by just 0.75 per cent a year, then the Treasury projects that the
surplus will grow to over 2 per cent of GDP by 2001–02.) Our projections are for
public finances to remain in deficit over the medium term, though the deficit is
quite sustainable — at less than 1 per cent of GDP. This reflects the steps taken
under both the last government and the current government to raise additional
revenue over the medium term.
11
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but weaker in 1999 and 2000 (0.8 per cent and 1.9 per cent compared with 2.1 per cent and 2.6 per cent).
11The key measures were the abolition of profit-related pay and restriction of capital allowances on long-life assets
in the November 1996 Budget, and the restriction of tax relief to pension funds in the July 1997 Budget. Recent
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There are two reasons for these discrepancies between our own assessment and
the official view of the outlook for public finances. First, as consumer spending
weakens in 1999 and 2000, we expect the boost to public finances from the
current period of consumer-led growth to unwind to some degree. Second, the
outlook for public spending implied by our model results in a stronger profile for
public spending than even the highest of the Treasury projections. This analysis
suggests that the government should err on the side of caution in framing its tax
plans. There is still a danger of a repeat of the problems of forecasting and control
of public finances that we saw in the late 1980s and early 1990s — albeit on a
smaller scale. And the likelihood that public finances are likely to improve
significantly in the short term adds to the risk of an excessive relaxation of fiscal
policy in the run-up to the next election which would then need to be reversed.
V. CONCLUSIONS
The analysis we have presented in this paper suggests that medium-term
projections of public sector borrowing need to take account of two key features of
the relationship between public finances and the level of economic activity. First,
                                                                                                                             
in real terms, which also helps to strengthen public finances over the medium term. A lower equilibrium
unemployment rate (5–6 per cent in our forecast) also helps the medium-term outlook for public finances.
FIGURE 4
PSBR Projections as a Percentage of GDP
Title:  Hall/O'Sullivan fig 4
Creator:  FreeHand 7.0
CreationDate:  27/1/98 1:40 pm
Source: LBS Economic Outlook, London Business School, November 1997.Modelling and Forecasting UK Public Finances
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current public expenditure tends to rise in line with GDP growth, once allowance
is made for cyclical effects and shifts in the equilibrium unemployment rate.
Unless this tendency of public spending changes, the only levers available to cut
public spending as a share of GDP are measures that reduce the equilibrium
unemployment rate or further cuts in capital spending. (Interestingly, the new
government is operating on both fronts, hoping to reduce equilibrium
unemployment by Welfare to Work and shifting capital spending off the balance
sheet through the Private Finance Initiative.)
Second, the responsiveness of tax receipts to economic growth over the cycle
depends on whether swings in economic activity are consumer-led or export-led. A
consumption-driven cycle, such as we saw in the late 1980s and early 1990s, is
likely to produce a larger cyclical improvement in public finances, followed by a
more rapid deterioration. Given that the current upswing in the UK economy is
being driven by consumer spending, this suggests that this year and next will see a
rapid improvement in public finances. However, this cyclical movement is likely to
exaggerate the extent of any underlying improvement in public finances. It does
not provide the basis for a significant relaxation of fiscal policy in the second half
of the current Parliament.
APPENDIX: MODELLING GOVERNMENT EXPENDITURE
In our models of public expenditure, the dependent variable is the ratio of the
spending variable to GDP, implicitly imposing a unit coefficient on the spending
variable with respect to GDP. In the model for government consumption, we
expect GR (the ratio of current expenditure on goods and services to GDP) to be
stationary allowing for the effect of the cycle, captured by GAP (the difference
between the log of real GDP and its trend value). It is necessary to allow for the
cycle because, whilst we expect government spending to rise with GDP in the long
run, it is much more stable than national output in the short run.
To explain government grants to the personal sector — the bulk of which are
accounted for by social security payments — we construct a variable SSR which
expresses grants to the personal sector as a percentage of GDP. In the social
security expenditure model, we expect SSR to be stationary, allowing for the cycle
(GAP) and the unemployment rate (U). We also include RELP, the ratio of the
retail price index to RPIX, the retail price index excluding mortgage payments.
In estimating models for these two key expenditure variables, we test for
cointegration using the Johansen procedure. This requires starting from a very
general VAR model, and reducing to a more parsimonious model with fewer lags,
using appropriate model selection criteria. We also consider the possibility that the
effects of discretionary policy shifts will require the use of dummy variables,
particularly around the time of general elections.Fiscal Studies
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1. Government Consumption
Our model of government consumption of goods and services explains current
consumption, deflated by the GDP deflator, (G) in terms of GDP and trend GDP.
Our procedure was to test for cointegration between the ratio of G to real GDP
(GR) and the difference between actual and trend GDP (constructed by regressing
log GDP on a linear trend over the period 1975Q1 to 1994Q3, giving a trend
growth rate of 2.14 per cent per annum). A lag length of two periods is chosen —
the shortest lag length consistent with eliminating fourth-order serial correlation in
the VAR — and dummy variables for outlying quarters are included as I(0)
variables. The results of the Johansen maximum eigenvalue test are presented in
Table A.1.
These results strongly suggest the existence of one cointegrating vector. The
Johansen procedure gives estimated values for this cointegrating vector, which are
used to construct the error correction term, GECM. The estimated loading weight
is –0.36804. Reparameterising the model and including the error correction term
derived from the Johansen estimation allows us to derive the final model. Standard
t-tests for parameter significance are given in parentheses below the coefficients.
) 7 . 4 ( ) 9 . 1 ( ) 7 . 4 (
) 1 ( 00 . 1 ) 1 ( 23 . 0 57 . 0 ) 1 ( - D - - D - - - D = D GAP GR GDP G
) 3 . 2 ( ) 1 . 4 ( ) 7 . 4 (
029 . 0 055 . 0 ) 2 ( 37 . 0 D79Q2 D76Q2 GECM - + - -
) 0 . 3 ( ) 0 . 2 (
037 . 0 ) 1 ( 28 . 0 D85Q2 D79Q2 - - -
TABLE A.1
Cointegration Analysis: Government Spending on Goods and Services
I(1) variables: GR, GAP.
I(0) variables: D76Q2, D79Q2, D79Q2(–1), D85Q2.
Null Alternative Statistic 95% critical value 90% critical value
r = 0 r = 1 23.3728 14.0690 12.0710
r = 1 r = 2 1.8548 3.7620 2.6870
GECM = GR + 1.0598 GAP
where GR is the log of the ratio of government consumption to GDP and GAP is
the difference between (log) GDP and (log) trend GDP.





Serial correlation 2 c (4): 5.0776
Functional form 2 c (1): 0.8857
Normality 2 c (2): 1.3723
Heteroscedasticity 2 c (1): 0.2430
2. Government Grants to the Personal Sector
The structure of our equation explaining government grants is similar to that for
spending on goods and services, though we include more dummies to capture
political influences, as well as the effect of the unemployment rate (U) and the
difference between RPI inflation and underlying inflation (RELP). In two periods,
social security spending deviated from its long-run relationship: 1978–79 and
1992–94. The first period (captured by the dummy variable LABG) represents a
period during which public spending limits were relaxed in the run-up to an
election, allowing some catch-up of benefit levels following a period of spending
restraint. The new Conservative administration reversed this upward shift. The
strong growth of social security payments in 1992–94 also accompanied a period
of public spending relaxation. This expansion (captured by the dummy variable
INVB) may also reflect some rise in ‘hidden unemployment’ as the invalidity
benefit regime was relaxed and absorbed some of the long-term unemployed.
As with the government consumption model, we test for cointegration using the
Johansen maximum likelihood procedure. A lag length of three periods is chosen
using the same model selection criterion. The results are presented in Table A.2.
SSR is the (log) ratio of social security payments (government grants to the
personal sector) to GDP, U is the unemployment rate and RELP is the (log) ratio
of RPI to RPIX. Two cointegration vectors are identified by this test. The
corresponding error correction terms are given here:
TABLE A.2
Cointegration Analysis: Grants to Personal Sector
I(1) variables: SSR, GAP, U, RELP.
I(0) variables: LABG, INVB, D83Q1.
Null Alternative Statistic 95% critical value 90% critical value
r = 0 r = 1 36.1549 27.0670 24.7340
r = 1 r = 2 22.7686 20.9670 18.5980
r = 2 r = 3 8.9051 14.0690 12.0710
r = 3 r = 4 0.7073 3.7620 2.6870Fiscal Studies
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SSR is the (log) ratio of social security payments (government grants to the
personal sector) to GDP, U is the unemployment rate and RELP is the (log) ratio
of RPI to RPIX. Two cointegration vectors are identified by this test. The
corresponding error correction terms are given here:
SSECM1 = SSR + 1.82 GAP – 0.027 U – 2.33 RELP;
SSECM2 = SSR + 0.24 GAP – 0.047 U + 0.80 RELP.
As with the model for government consumption, the error correction terms are
included in the reparameterised equation. Straightforward t-tests show that
SSECM2 and logged changes in RELP are insignificant, and so they are excluded
from the final model listed below. Again, standard t-tests for parameter
significance are given in parentheses below the coefficients.
) 8 . 4 ( ) 0 . 6 ( ) 2 . 5 (
) 1 ( 87 . 0 ) 1 ( 66 . 0 92 . 0 - D - - D - - = D GAP SSR SSR
) 1 . 5 ( ) 3 . 5 ( ) 1 . 5 (
035 . 0 ) 2 ( 40 . 0 ) 1 ( 031 . 0 LABG SSECM1 U + - - - D +
) 2 . 4 ( ) 9 . 3 (
024 . 0 052 . 0 INVB D83Q1 - -




Serial correlation 2 c (4): 1.2424
Functional form 2 c (1): 0.2182
Normality 2 c (2): 0.1187
Heteroscedasticity 2 c (1): 1.7978
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